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 On High Hopes and Disappointment 
The Broken Promises 
of the 2014 European Elections 
 
ALEXANDRA IANCU 
 
 
 
 High hopes and “enthusiastic” claims of European revival surrounded 
the organization of the 2014 European elections. On 22-25 of May 2014, 
European citizens from the 28 EU member states cast their votes in the elections 
for the 751 members the European Parliament. Although the EP’s competencies 
steadily increased over the last decades, the growth in the EP powers did not 
improve the EP’s levels of approval among the European citizenries. The 
electoral turnout rates show a constant decline across the European 
democracies1. More recently, the entry into force of new sets of rules and EP 
prerogatives provided the MEPs with the power to break the chain of 
dissatisfaction with the EU institutions. In 2014, for the first time in the history 
of the Union, member states had to “take into account” the European elections’ 
results in the nomination of the President of the European Commission2. The 
procedure limited the European Council’s leverage in negotiating the 
nomination of the future head of the Commission and created new opportunities 
for unification and personalization of the European electoral race. Several 
                                                 
1
 Joseph H.H. Weiler, “European Parliament Elections 2014: Europe’s Fateful Choices,” 
The European Journal of International Law, vol. 24, no. 3, 2013, p. 747. 
2
 The article 17.7 of the Treaty on the European Union provides that: “Taking into account 
the elections to the European Parliament and after having held the appropriate 
consultations, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall propose to the 
European Parliament a candidate for President of the Commission. This candidate shall be 
elected by the European Parliament by a majority of its component members. If he does 
not obtain the required majority, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, 
shall within one month propose a new candidate who shall be elected by the European 
Parliament following the same procedure”. However, the same article reads that selection 
of the Commission members should rely on a joint effort of the Commission Presidency 
and the Council. Member states continue thus to make proposals of individual 
commissioners based on broad criteria of selection (art. 17.3) “members of the 
Commission shall be chosen on the ground of their general competence and European 
commitment from persons whose independence is beyond doubt”. See Lisbon Treaty, 
available at: http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-europeanunion-
and-comments/title-3-provisions-on-the-institutions/86-article-17.html (last accessed 
1.11.2014) 
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months prior to the elections, the European party families pointed to potential 
leaders of the Commission. The nominees for this non-elective position 
announced however they would be “running” for the office and would conduct 
electoral campaigns in all the European democracies. The party-driven strategy 
challenged the canonical views on the European Commission’s technocratic 
profile3, but at the same time, had the potential to foster “meaningful” 
mechanisms of representation4. In this view, the nomination procedure for the 
President of the Commission, based on the EP directly elected majorities, 
brought more legitimacy to the electoral competition, symbolically transforming 
the Commission in a functional equivalent of a European executive. The 
manufacturing of leveling mechanisms in the EP elections, the virtual race for 
appointing the head of the Commission, relied primarily on the European 
leaders’ political will. No particular institutional safeguards guaranteed the 
“frontrunner” in the elections, the actual office nomination5. 
The transformation in the European Commission recruitment procedures 
focused on reproducing at the EU level the nation-state political experiences or, 
at least, creating the illusion of symmetrical practices in both European and 
national elections. The European parties’ interpretation of the Lisbon Treaty 
introduced adaptive replies to the ongoing claims referring to the EU 
democratic deficit. So far, a rich body of literature captured the EU “lack of 
legitimacy” and its manifestations: the structural decline in the EP elections 
turnouts, the recent lack of trust in the European institutions and the 
consolidation of the Eurosceptic voices. Several alternative justifications have 
been put forward in order to clarify this attitude of “disenchantment with 
Europe”. First, the lack of interest in the EU competitions relied on the 
specificity of the European institutions and the lack of a direct connection 
                                                 
3
 Agata Gostyńska, “The European Parliament and European Commission after the May 
Elections: An Indispensable Partnership?”, The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 
no. 1, 2014, p. 83. 
4
 Joseph H.H. Weiler, “European Parliament Elections 2014...cit.”, p. 749, Francis Jacobs 
et al., “European Parliament Elections in Times of Crisis”, Intereconomics, vol. 49, no.1, 
2014, pp. 4-29. 
5
 In the early 90s, Jacques Delors promoted the idea of personalizing the EP competitions. 
The same recipe for enhancing democracy prompted again on the occasion of the 
Convention for the Future of Europe (in 2000s). The Lisbon Treaty finally succeeded to 
include the “presidentialization” of the European politics. Moreover, in order to bypass 
the European Councils’ attributions, the main European party families decided to openly 
endorse candidates for the Commission Presidency prior to the EP elections. The PE 
resolution on the 4 July 2013 points thus to the joint “political” agreement concerning the 
informal link shaped between electoral results and the leading position within the 
Commission. Currently, the European party family, which gathered most of the votes, also 
holds the first nomination of a candidate in charge with forming a parliamentary majority. 
For further details see Agata Gostyńska, “The European Parliament and European 
Commission after the May Elections…cit.”,p. 85.  
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between voters’ expectations and the EP prerogatives. More precisely, for some 
authors6, European citizens do not perceive the issues placed under the EP 
jurisdiction as decisive for their living standards. Given the continuous 
expansion in the EP’s competences, this explanation remains however 
paradoxical. Since the late 80s, the Parliament benefited from an increase in 
formal roles (budgetary and legislative prerogatives, setting advanced forms to 
oversight the European Commission activity7). Consequently, the lack of 
interest in European elections and the disenchantment with the EU institutions 
is less dependent on the salience of issues discussed on the European arena and 
more related to the citizens’ lack of knowledge on European affairs. European 
politics does not provide voters with clear and significant choices. 
The second major explanation of the EU democratic deficit refers to the 
well-known “second order” elections thesis8. Scholars continuously denounced 
the hybrid articulation of the EU regime. European institutional arrangements 
do not allow the articulation of traditional parliamentary majorities and the 
emergence of a new executive9. Both citizens and the media have thus little 
incentive to participate in the electoral processes. Conversely, the EP elections 
become rehearsals for national level competitions or opportunities in 
sanctioning the national governments’ performances10. National parties have the 
                                                 
6
 Andrew Moravcsik, “In Defence of the Democratic Deficit: Reassessing Legitimacy 
in the European Union,” Journal of Common Market Law Review, vol. 40, no. 4, 
2002, pp. 603-624; Nicholas Clark, “Explaining Low Turnout in European Elections: The 
Role of Issue Salience and Institutional Perceptions in Elections to the European 
Parliament”, Journal of European Integration, vol. 36, no. 4, 2014, pp. 339-356/p. 340. 
7
 Agata Gostyńska, “The European Parliament and European Commission after the May 
Elections…cit.”, p.84; for an historical overview of the changes in the EP’s prerogatives 
see Jacobs et al., “European Parliament Elections…cit.”, pp. 4-29. 
8
 Karlheinz Reif, Hermann Schmitt, “Nine Second-Order National Elections – A 
Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results,” European 
Journal of Political Research, vol. 8, no.1, 1980, pp. 3-44; Hermann Schmitt, “The 
European Parliament Elections of June 2004: Still Second Order?”, West European 
Politics, vol. 28, no.3, 2005, pp. 650–679; Karlheinz Reif, “European Elections as 
Member State Second-Order Elections Revisited”, European Journal of Political 
Research, vol. 31, no.1-2, 1997, pp. 115-124. 
9
 Karlheinz Reif, Hermann Schmitt, “Nine Second-Order National Elections…cit.”, p. 8; 
Michael Marsh, “Testing the Second-Order Election Model after Four European 
Elections,” British Journal of Political Science, vol. 28, no. 4, 1998, pp. 591-607; Paul 
Magnette, “Appointing and Censuring the European Commission: The Adaptation of 
Parliamentary Institutions to the Community Context”, European Law Journal, vol. 7, no. 3, 
2001, pp. 292-310. 
10
 Daniel Stockemer, “Parliament Elections Citizens' support for the European Union and 
Participation”, European Union Politics,vol. 13, no. 1, 2012, pp. 26-46/p. 27; Till Weber, 
“A Top-Down Approach to European Parliament Elections”, European Union Politics, 
vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 509-536/p. 511; Jan Kovar, Kamil Kovar, “National or European? The 
EP Election Campaign Themes in the New Media”, European Electoral Studies, vol. 7, 
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monopoly in selecting the MEP candidates and run in the European elections 
based on a nationally driven agenda11. The MEPs reelection remains directly 
dependent on the relationship with the national party leadership and on the local 
constituency support12. Symmetrically, citizens continue to express their 
electoral preferences by assessing the national parties’ performances in public 
offices13. The failure of the European elections in becoming agents of European 
driven programmatic issues is not due to the lack of ideological differentiations. 
The left/right economic divide is a structural dimension in shaping electoral 
choices in the EP elections14, along with other cleavages referring to a cultural 
dimension (conservative vs. liberal views) or pro vs. anti-integration issues15. 
Nevertheless, these distinctions remain embedded in national parties’ 
performances and objectives16. On the European arena, party activities are 
characterized by indistinctiveness and incoherent behavior. On the one hand, the 
main EP groups preserve high levels of party discipline and cohesion (the 
European People's Party, the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats 
or the Greens). On the other hand, the overall indicators of party discipline 
                                                                                                                       
no. 1, 2012, pp. 30-41. 
11
 Till Weber, “A Top-Down Approach…cit.”,pp. 509-536; Sara B. Hobolt, Jae-Jae Spoon, 
James Tilley, “A Vote against Europe? Explaining Defection at the 1999 and 2004 
European Parliament Elections”, British Journal of Political Science, vol. 39, no.1, 2008, 
pp. 93-115.  
12
 Roger Scully, Becoming Europeans? Attitudes, Behaviour, and Socialization in the 
European Parliament(Understanding Institutional Socialization), Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2005, pp. 67-89. 
13
 Rory Costello, Jacques Thomassen, Martin Rosema, “European Parliament Elections and 
Political Representation: Policy Congruence between Voters and Parties”, West European 
Politics, vol. 35, no. 6, 2012, pp. 1226-1248/p. 1129. 
14
 Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Carole Wilson, “Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions 
on European Integration?”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 35, 2002, pp. 965–
989;Simon Hix , Abdoul Noury, Gerard Roland, “Dimensions of Politics in the European 
Parliament”, American Journal of Political Science, vol. 50, no. 2, 2006, pp. 494-520; 
Simon Hix, Abdoul Noury, “After Enlargement: Voting Patterns in the Sixth European 
Parliament”, Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 2, 2009, pp. 159-174. Note should 
be made that in the EP elections the left-right divide oftentimes emerges as a new conflict 
i.e. North versus South, East versus West see Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “A 
Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining 
Dissensus”, Bristish Journal of political Science, vol. 39, 2008, pp. 1-23/p. 15. 
15
 Tapio Raunio, “Political Parties in the European Union”, in Knud Erick Jørgensen et al. 
(eds.), Handbook of European Union Politics, Sage Publications, London, 2006, pp. 247-
263/p. 251; Peter Mair, “Popular Democracy and EU Enlargement”, East European 
Politics and Societies, vol. 17, no. 1, 2003, pp. 58-63. 
16
 For instance, in the Italian case, Serricchio found that the low turnouts are connected to 
the citizens’ low interest/high dissatisfaction with politics, but the attitudes concerning the 
European elections are also linked to the levels of satisfaction with European integration, 
identity claims and EU functioning. See: Fabio Serricchio, “The 2009 European Election 
in Italy: National or European?”, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, vol. 15, 
no. 2, 2014, pp. 198-215. 
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oftentimes hide eclectic or non-affiliated votes. In this latter case, the extent of 
partisan influence over roll call voting varies according to different policy areas. 
Agriculture, employment or social affairs are the most divisive domains, as they 
have a direct potential impact on national electorates17. The lack of a European 
party ideological convergence on national salient issues and the circumvention 
of the European integration debates (enlargement prospects, EU value-systems, 
defective institutional mechanisms, etc.) enhanced the growing disenchantment 
with the EU policies18. In fact, the parties’ programmatic Europeanization remains 
only a marginal phenomenon, of little impact on electoral competitions19. Framing 
European races as midterm forms of evaluation of national governments20 
concurs thus with the elite behavior at the EU level. Both European elites and 
the citizens rank national loyalty higher in the hierarchy of values than 
ideological affiliation21. Although the thesis of the second-order elections has 
recently been refined, by showing that some of the voters also refer to European 
evolutions in setting their electoral preferences (at least in Western Europe)22, 
                                                 
17
 Publically available data from VoteWatch Europe and research. For further details see: 
Yves Bertoncini, Valentin Kreilinger, “What Political Balance of Power in the Next 
European Parliament?”, Notre Europe-Jacques Delors Institute,  Policy Paper 102, 24 
November 2013, available at: http://www.notre-europe.eu/media/balanceofpowerep2014 
bertoncinikreilingerne-jdinov2013.pdf?pdf=ok (last accessed 3.10.2014). 
18
 Till Weber, “A Top-Down Approach…cit.”,p. 531.  
19
 Isabelle Hertner, “Are European Election Campaigns Europeanized? The Case of the 
Party of European Socialists in 2009”, Government and Opposition, vol. 46, no. 3, 2013, 
pp. 321-344; Paul Pennings, “An Empirical Analysis of the Europeanization of National 
Party Manifestos 1960-2003”, European Union Politics, vol. 7, no. 2. 2006, pp. 257-270. 
20
 Gary Marks et al., “National Political Parties and European Integration”, American 
Journal of Political Science, vol. 46, no.3, 2002, pp. 585-594. 
21
 According to the literature, citizens consider the EP elections as an opportunity to 
sanction national governments in a protest vote (Cees van der Eijk, Mark Franklin, “The 
Sleeping Giant: Potential for Political Mobilization of Disaffection with European 
Integration”, in Wouter van der Brug, Cees van der Eijk (eds.), European Elections & 
Domestic Politics: Lessons from the Past and Scenarios for the Future, University of 
Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 2007, pp. 189-209). The timing of the elections is the 
most important factor. In the post-electoral year the government party benefit of high 
levels of support. However, in the mid-term of the governmental mandate disenchanted 
citizens turn to the opposition by sanctioning the majority party in the EP elections. 
Although governing parties might regain some of the electoral loss towards the end of the 
national electoral cycle  based on the economic performance of the national 
government, this thesis remains rather controversial from the perspective of the empirical 
findings. For further analyses see: Thad Kousser, “Retrospective Voting and Strategic 
Behavior in European Parliament Elections”, Electoral Studies, vol. 23, no. 1, 2004, pp. 
1-21; Simon Hix, Michael Marsh, “Punishment or Protest? Understanding European 
Parliament elections”, Journal of Politics, vol. 69, no. 2, 2007, pp. 495-510.  
22
 Nicholas Clark, “Explaining Low Turnout in European Elections…cit.”, p. 342; Richard 
S. Flickinger, Donley T. Studlar, “One Europe, Many Electorates?: Models of Turnout in 
European Parliament Elections After 2004”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 40, no. 4, 
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the European elections still remain “local” political competitions. 
In the EP elections, as opposed to national level competitions, 
retrospective voting and low turnouts are not necessarily linked to the quality of 
representatives in public offices. The MEPs’ selection commonly promotes high 
profile politicians (some of them at the final stages of their political careers)23, 
more gender balanced criteria of recruitment24 or, in the ECE region, 
experienced politicians with the ability to self-finance political campaigns25. 
The implicit criticism of the EP elections primarily targets the very definition of 
“representation” in supranational settings. First, despite of the recent efforts in 
providing a unitary framework for the European races, parties continue to 
compete within the national settings, according to non-unitary electoral 
regulations (which only share in common the proportional representation 
principle and some general restrictions on the MEPs incompatibilities)26. By the 
same token, in the European system of representation, the seat allocation is not 
directly proportional with the country population. The “degressive 
proportionality” principle27, although it ensures a more balanced EP 
representation of the member states, distorts the political equality principle, 
notably the fundamental democratic value expressed through the ideal of “one 
person/one vote”. Conversely, the eclectic nature of representation at the EU 
                                                                                                                       
2007, pp. 383-404/p. 383. The EU referential is also related to the disapproval of national 
parties’ activities at the EU level: See Nick Clark, Robert Rohrschneider, “Second-Order 
Elections versus First-Order Thinking: How Voters Perceive the Representation Process in a 
Multi-Layered System of Governance”, Journal of European Integration, vol. 31, no. 5, 
2009, pp. 645-664. 
23
 See Luca Verzichelli, Michael Edinger, “A Critical Juncture? The 2004 European 
Elections and the Making of a Supranational Elite”, The Journal of Legislative Studies, 
vol. 11, no. 2, 2005, pp. 254-274; José Real Dato, Miguel Jerez Mir, “Las carreras 
políticas de los europarlamentarios españoles (1986-2007)”,Comunicación presentada al 
GT8 del VIII Congreso de la AECPA, Valencia, September 2007 available at: 
http://www.aecpa.es/uploads/files/congresos/congreso_08/area3/GT-8/REAL-DATO-
JOSE.pdf (last accessed 1.11.2014). 
24
 Cristina Chiva, “Gender, European Integration and Candidate Recruitment: The European 
Parliament Elections in the New EU Member States”, Parliamentary Affairs, vol.67, no. 2, 
2014, pp. 458-494. 
25
 For example, in the Romanian case, Gherghina and Chiru identified politicians’ wealth as 
a major determinant in the candidate selection for the EP elections. See Sergiu Gherghina, 
Mihail Chiru, “Practice and Payment: Determinants of Candidate List Position in 
European Parliament Elections”, European Union Politics, vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 533-552. 
26
 European Parliament electoral procedures hold that the elections are based on European 
and national provisions. Despite of the need to impose a common electoral system, the 
member states had not reached an agreement regarding the articulation of a common 
electoral code. For a brief summary see: The European Parliament, “Electoral 
Procedures”, Fact Sheets on the European Union – 2014, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_1.3.4.pdf (last accessed on 1.11.2014) 
27
 Benjamin D. Hennig et.al, “European Parliament Elections 2014”, Political Insight, vol. 
5, no. 2, 2014, pp. 20-21. 
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level fosters additional questions and forms of resistance concerning the full-
fledged legitimacy and democratic character of the EP elections. To wit, the 
German Federal Constitutional Tribunal in two recent judgments on the 
introduction of an electoral threshold in the EP Elections Act directly 
challenged the thesis of a perfect symmetry between national and European 
elections28. The 2011 and the 2014 judgments of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht(BVerfG, 2 BvC 4/10 vom 9.11.2011, 2 BvE 2/13 of 
02.26.2014)29showed that the electoral law was in breach of the national level 
constitutional principles. The Court argued on the two occasions that the 
adoption of a 5% (respectively 3%) electoral threshold in the European 
elections is inconsistent with the principles of voting equality and the equal 
opportunities right of the political parties in the distribution of seats. The Court 
judgments provide that although within nation states these principles are not 
absolute rights and they are legitimately weighted with the public interest -
government effectiveness (in order to decrease political fragmentation and 
ensure governmental stability) a similar interpretation could not be directly 
applicable in the case of the European elections due to the specific functions of 
the EP. For the German Court, the distinction between the two sets of elections 
relied on several factors: (1) the multiplicity of parties represented in the 
European Parliament (over 160 national parties) did not justify the introduction 
of national restrictions or additional thresholds), (2) the EP already had a long 
tradition of heterogeneous composition in forming political groups which can 
directly contribute in enhancing diversity and strengthening cooperation of the 
two largest EP groups, (3) the EP legislating procedures and activities are not 
functions of a parliamentary majority (and more importantly, the electoral law 
should not be built on instrumental goals) and, (4) the EP elections are not 
conducive to the formation of a government. In the BVerfG2 BvE 2/13 of 
02.26.2014 judgment (on 26th of February 2014), the Court even discarded the 
views according to which the nomination of the Commission Presidency 
represented a major shift in the EU democratization process. The Court held 
that the recent changes were “merely a EP aspiration” and found no grounds to 
accept (for the time being) limitations on voting principles: “The 3% threshold 
                                                 
28
 For an overview of the 2011 and 2014 judgments see European Parliamentary Research 
Service, brief “Electoral Thresholds in European Elections Developments in Germany”, 
27/02/2014. Available online at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/ 
briefing/2013/130606/LDM_BRI(2013)130606_REV2_EN.pdf (last accessed 1.10.2014) 
29
 For the judgments see: Federal Constitutional Court, 9th November 2011, BVerfG, 2 BvC 
4/10vom 9.11.2011, Absatz-Nr. (1-160), available at: http://www.bverfg.de/entschei 
dungen/cs20111109_2bvc000410.html (last accessed 7.11.2014), and the German Federal 
Constitutional Court, 26th February 2014, 2 BvE 2/13 of 02.26.2014, paragraph no. (1-86) 
Available at: http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20140226_2bve000213.html (last 
accessed 14.11.2014). 
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finds no justification in terms of expected political and institutional 
developments and related changes in the operating conditions of the European 
Parliament in the next election period”. Conversely, given the EP tradition of 
bargaining procedures, the two main political groups could easily reach an 
agreement in supporting a common candidate irrespective of the ability to form 
a stable EU parliamentary majority. In 2014, the Court reiterated the 2011 
argument according to which, as opposed to the nation states constitutional 
traditions, at the EU level greater diversity would bring more democracy.  
The German Federal Constitutional Tribunal recent judgments illustrate a 
more profound criticism of the European Union functioning, which tackles the 
issue of political representation within supra-national organizations. According 
to the third major explanation of the EU democratic deficit, the European 
project is confronted with an inherent problem of institutional design (shaping 
mechanisms of representation and accountability in a context in which some of 
the founding principles of the liberal state cannot be directly transposed at the 
EU level). As noted by Weiler, the EU crisis of legitimacy does not lie with but 
within the EU internal articulation30:  
 
“In fact the people are wiser than their elected representatives in the European 
Parliament and elsewhere. For they intuit the truth: with all its increased powers it still 
makes no difference to Europe, and in Europe, whether and how the people vote for the 
European Parliament… Democracy normally must have some meaningful mechanism for 
expression of voter preference predicated on choice among options, typically informed by 
stronger or weaker ideological orientation. That is an indispensable component of politics. 
Democracy without politics is an oxymoron”.  
 
In Weiler’s view, the EU structural deficiencies are rooted in the lack of 
politicization of the European institutions (particularly the lack of a politicized 
criteria of setting the Commission), and thus, the recent reforms are steps 
forward to the creation of a European democracy. Further reforms consisting in 
the political transplants of the nation states’ traditional check and balance 
system could ensure the creation of a functional European democracy. The 
optimistic view on the role of institutional changes in boosting political 
participation is echoing previous European debates referring to the 
“constitutionalization” of Europe. For Habermas, for instance, the creation of a 
collective European identity is embedded in the democratization process and 
directly dependent on the articulation of a European public sphere: “There can 
be no European federal state worthy of the title of an European democracy 
unless a European-wide, integrated public sphere develops in the ambit of a 
common political culture….”31. Shaping democracy in Europe directly depends 
                                                 
30
 Joseph H.H. Weiler, “European Parliament Elections 2014...cit.”, pp. 748-749. 
31
 Jürgen Habermas, “Does Europe Need a Constitution? Response to Dieter Grimm”, in 
Ciaran Cronin, Pablo De Greiff (eds.), The Inclusion of the Other. Studies in Political 
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on institutions, norms and procedures acting as “catalysts” in the creation of a 
transnational public sphere. Despite the commonly shared diagnosis of the EU 
severe democratic deficit, these views provide rather optimistic conclusions 
concerning the EU potential for change through institutional reforms. In this 
line of thought, the 2014 elections could constitute a foundational 
“constitutional moment”32 (even in the absence of the adoption of a written 
constitutional regulations) and a turning point in legitimizing the Union. Yet, in 
a historical perspective, the integrative role of constitutional provisions within 
the nation-states had been proven rather insufficient in the attempts of shaping 
social cohesion33. As Grimm noted 34: “While constitutions provided they are 
intended to operate as legally binding texts ‒ automatically produce normative 
effects, their integrative influence is a different manner. …Integration takes 
place in the real world...”. Even more so, at the EU level, “constitutionalizing” 
reforms that lack cultural and social grounding can produce reverse effects, 
increasing the gap between the European institutions and the citizens35. 
According to Grimm, the low turnouts or the Euro-skeptical positions should be 
better met with extra-legal or symbolic means in order to achieve further 
integration. Surmounting defective or incomplete regulations and politicizing the 
European decision-making procedures is not enough to create a European demos. 
 
 
The Broken Promise of the 2014 EP Elections  
 
In recent years, most of the debates on the EU targeted above all the 
question of democratic deficit. The obligation to take into account the results of 
the EU elections in the appointment of the Commission Presidency was 
enthusiastically received as a rapid way of increasing legitimacy without 
profoundly altering the internal balance of power between the EU institutions. 
Paradoxically, the reform entailed primarily symbolic outcomes: competing for 
the Presidency of European Commission, the imitation of an electoral race for 
what remains in essence a public appointment by the member states represented 
in the European Council. Candidates ran in the European race, defended their 
                                                                                                                       
Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1998, pp. 155-165/p. 160. 
32
 In the sense of Bruce Ackerman’s theory of constitutional moments – historical events 
rarely arising, critical junctures in which politics and society meet in order to transform 
the political regime. For further details see: Bruce Ackerman, We the People: 
Foundations, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1991. 
33
 Dieter Grimm, “Integration by Constitution”, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 
vol. 3, no. 2&3, 2005, pp.193-208 
34
 Ibidem,pp. 195, 199, 207. 
35
 Dieter Grimm, “Does Europe Need a Constitution?”, in Peter Gowan, Perry Anderson 
(eds.), The Question of Europe, Verso, London, 1997, pp. 239-259. 
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political platforms in heated debates, with no substantial guarantee concerning 
the ability of implementing their programs. A politicized nomination alone at 
the top of the EU Commission could not replace a programmatically coherent 
team36 or the support of a less eclectic Parliamentary majority. The emblematic 
institutional shift towards more politics and less bureaucracy in Europe was 
particularly important, given the severe loss of confidence in the EU 
institutions. Recent surveys reported unsettling results. Significant drops in 
satisfaction levels with the EU institutions are widespread in countries directly 
affected by the economic crisis such as Greece, Portugal and Spain. The 2013 
Eurobarometer reported considerable declines in the EU levels of public trust, 
which ranged from 50% in 2004 to only 31% in 201337. In 2004, more than half 
of the EU citizens declared that their voices did not count in the EU (52%), 
however, by 2013, the percentage reached two thirds of the European 
population38. The emergence of euro-critical positions and the economic crisis 
explain in part the low electoral turnouts39. 
In the 2014 elections, turnout levels reached a new low (42.54%). The 
recent reforms, instead of boosting political participation and public interest in 
the EU race, did not considerably alter public apathy (see Table 1). The 2014 
electoral results confirm thus previous trends: turnout levels in new member 
states remain significantly lower than in the Western European countries (i.e. 
Czech Republic 18.20%, Slovakia 13.05%, Poland 23.83%, Slovenia 24.55%). 
Regardless of political culture or the country traditions, the EU institutional 
changes had little consequences on electoral mobilization. In only four countries 
this year elections brought a revival of citizens’ interest in the European 
elections: Germany (+4.83%), Sweden (5.54%), Greece (7.36%), and Lithuania 
(+26.37%). However, the objective of reversing the citizens’ attitudes towards 
the EP elections was attained only in Germany and Sweden. In Greece, the 
turnout change seems to be rather related to a restoration of former levels of 
                                                 
36
 Joseph H.H. Weiler, “European Parliament Elections 2014...cit.”, p. 751.  
37
 Stijn van Kessel, Andrea L.P. Pirro, “Discontent on the Move: Prospects for Populist 
Radical Right Parties in the 2014 European Parliament Elections”, Intereconomics. 
Review of European Economic Policy, vol. 49, no.1, 2014, p. 15. 
38
 Sonia Piedrafita, Vilde Renman, “Euroscepticism in the Next European Parliament: A 
Reason to Worry?”, Intereconomics. Review of European Economic Policy, vol. 49, no. 1, 
2014, pp. 24-29. 
39
 There is a correlation between assessing the EU membership as a good thing and electoral 
turnouts in the EU elections. For further details see Daniel Stockemer, “Parliament 
Elections Citizens' support…cit.”, p. 26. Evidently, turnout decline does not necessarily 
rely solely on dissatisfaction with the EU functioning. The accession of new member 
states (which did not have compulsory voting systems), differences in political culture, or 
the desire to punish national politicians (particularly in the new democracies) directly 
contribute to the low turnouts. See Mark N. Franklin, “How Structural Factors Cause 
Turnout Variations at European Parliament Elections”, European Union Politics, vol. 2, 
no. 3, 2001, pp. 309-328/p. 398.  
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participation (2009 being a historical low due to the crisis), whereas Lithuania 
doubled the turnout particularly due to the crisis in Ukraine and the UE-Russia 
relations. In some EU countries the turnout variations remain weak (i.e. Spain (-
1,06%), Poland (-0.7%), United Kingdom (+0.9%) and France (1.8%)), whereas 
in most of the European democracies, this year elections brought dramatic falls 
in the electoral participation levels: Latvia (-23.46%), Cyprus (-15.43%), Czech 
Republic (-10.02%), Italy (-7.83%), Hungary (-7.34%), Ireland (-6.2%), 
Denmark (-3.22%), etc. 
Moreover, the macro-level electoral results did not particularly alter the 
balance of power on the European arena or modify the level of political 
fragmentation in the EP. After the elections the EPP was reconfirmed as the 
main parliamentary group, despite an electoral decline (see Table 2). The main 
traditional opponents: the Christian-democrats and the social democrats hold 
together around 55% of seats in the European Parliament. As predicted by the 
German Constitutional Court in its 2014 judgment, setting a direct connection 
between the Presidency Commission and the EP elections relied on the creation 
of a “Grand Coalition” reuniting the main pro-integration party families (EPP, 
S&D and ALDE). In the aftermath on the elections, Jean-Claude Juncker, the 
EPP proposal for the Commission was confirmed by 422 votes. This first step 
towards the politicization of the Commission was not without contestation. The 
trend setter in this regard was the British Prime-minister, David Cameron, who 
echoed his country’s Eurosceptic turn. Cameron expressed concerns over the 
adoption of a new practice in appointing the head of the Commission. The 
conservative leader pointed to the citizens’ disquiet shown in the EP elections 
and to the implicit decrease of competencies of the Council (and thus of the 
individual member states). By the same token, the British Prime minister 
criticized the selection of Junker, one of the major supporters of reducing the 
nation states power within the EU40. Cameron was not the only political 
representative questioning the procedure or the candidate’s profile. In the 
European Council, the Hungarian Prime minister Viktor Orban and leader of 
Fidez (EPP) also opposed Junker’s nomination in order to defend “the interests 
of the Hungarian people”.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
40
 Nicholas Watt, Ian Traynor, “Juncker is Wrong Person for European Commission Job, 
Says David Cameron”, The Guardian, 27th of June 2014. Available at: 
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Table 1 
Electoral Turnouts in the European Elections in 2014 
 
 COUNTRY 2007 2013 2014 2014-2004 2014-2009 
Latvia 41,34 53,7 30,24 -11,1 -23,46 
Cyprus 72,5 59,4 43,97 -28,53 -15,43 
Czech Republic 28,3 28,22 18,2 -10,1 -10,02 
Italy 71,72 65,05 57,22 -14,5 -7,83 
Estonia 26,83 43,9 36,52 9,69 -7,38 
Hungary 38,5 36,31 28,97 -9,53 -7,34 
Slovakia 16,97 19,64 13,05 -3,92 -6,59 
Ireland 58,58 58,64 52,44 -6,14 -6,2 
Luxembourg 91,35 90,76 85,55 -5,8 -5,21 
Malta 82,39 78,79 74,8 -7,59 -3,99 
Slovenia 28,35 28,37 24,55 -3,8 -3,82 
Denmark 47,89 59,54 56,32 8,43 -3,22 
Portugal 38,6 36,77 33,67 -4,93 -3,1 
Germany 43 43,27 48,1 5,1 4,83 
Sweden 37,85 45,53 51,07 13,22 5,54 
Greece 63,22 52,61 59,97 -3,25 7,36 
Lithuania 48,38 20,98 47,35 -1,03 26,37 
  
Source: Turnout levels in the European Elections. Available on the EP website at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/turnout.html 
 
The political contestations of Junkers’ nomination were not the only 
shortcomings of the new appointment procedure. The European party families 
have now little incentives in questioning their membership, selectively accept 
new demands of joining the EP groups or sanctioning the political deviations of 
national parties. The raise of Eurosceptic or euro-critical parties in the recent 
elections further enhanced this trend. In previous electoral races, the PR system 
already favored the expression of anti-EU sentiments at institutional level41. The 
                                                 
41
 Paul Taggart, Aleks Szczerbiak, “Coming in from the Cold? Euroscepticism, Government 
Participation and Party Positions on Europe”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 51, 
no. 1, 2013, pp. 17-37; Catherine E. de Vries, Erica E. Edwards, “Taking Europe to Its 
Extremes: Extremist Parties and Public Euroscepticism”, Party Politics, vol. 15, no. 1, 
2009, pp. 5-28; Pieter de Wilde, Asimina Michailidou, Hans-Jörg Trenz, “Converging on 
Euroscepticism: Online Polity Contestation during EuropeanParliament Elections,” 
European Journal of Political Research, vol. 53, no. 4, 2014, pp. 766-783. 
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2014 EP elections boosted this tendency. In three of the biggest EU countries, 
populist parties succeeded to dominate the elections. UKIP won the EP 
elections in Britain defeating the traditional mainstream parties (27.5% of the 
votes), the Front National became the leading party in the French electoral race 
and, the Danish People party grow into the largest party in Denmark with 26.6% 
of the votes42. 
 
Table 2 
Main Results in the EP Elections: 2009 vs 2014 
 
  
 
 
2009 
 
2014 
Number 
of seats 
Score 
in % 
Number 
of seats 
Score 
in % 
European People's Party (Christian Democrats) 
-EPP 265 36 221 29.43  
Progressive Alliance of Socialists and 
Democrats in the European Parliament (S&D) 184 25 191 25.43  
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe 
(ALDE) 84 11.4 67 8.92  
Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance 
GREENS/EFA 55 7.5 50 6.66  
European Conservatives and Reformists Group 
(ECR) 54 7.3 70 9.32  
Confederal Group of the European United Left 
- Nordic Green Left (GUE/ NGL) 35 4.8 52 6.92 
Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group 
(EFD) 32 4.3 48 6.39 
Non-attached 27 3.7 52 6.92 
Source: European elections results, European Parliament,  
available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/election-results-2014.html 
 
Although the electoral success of these anti-immigrant parties rely on 
volatile electorates and negative voting, the 2014 EP elections confirmed the 
flourishing Eurosceptic, even Europhobic trends (which, in some countries, also 
enhanced the more moderate euro-critical stances of the traditional parties). 
Several other examples can be quoted throughout the European democracies: 
the right wing extremist party in Hungary Jobbik came in second after Fidez 
with 14.3% of the votes, Freedom Party in Austria won 19,72% of the votes, the 
neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn received 9.40% of the votes in Greece, the 
Swedish Democrats reached for the first time 9.7% of the votes whereas the 
Congress of the New Right (KNP) obtained 7.15% of the Polish votes, etc. 
Despite great variation in different forms of resistance to Europe: ranging from 
                                                 
42
 Raymond Kuhn, “The French Municipal and European Elections 2014”, Representation, 
vol. 50, no. 3, 2014, pp. 405-417. 
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anti-immigrant attitudes in the Western European parties to rather ethnocentric 
types of populism in the ECE region43, these parties are united by a common 
objection raised to the development of the European project. For the moment, 
the anti-European representation remains rather weak at the political level, due 
to the internal division of the movements and their reluctance in founding a 
right formula to transnational cooperation. Recent attempts to unify the 
Eurosceptic parties failed44. 
 
 
In this Issue: 
 
The 2014 elections exhibit rather contrasting experiences: high 
expectations and enthusiasm of the European leaders versus civic apathy of the 
European voters. The electoral outcomes raise thus new questions on the 
mechanisms that can foster legitimacy within the European member states. The 
high political fragmentation, the low turnouts and the strengthening of populist 
movements suggest that recent European reforms are far from filling the gap 
between the EU level and the citizens. Moreover, in the context of institutional 
change, the recent transgression of the left-right ideological divide and the 
creation of a grand pro-integration alliance within the European Parliament 
question the very essence of the reform. If more politicization of Europe is a 
stake, blurring of ideological lines can only cripple the accountability and the 
clarification of programmatic views on the European project. The appointment 
of a pro-integration figure as head of the European Commission can provide 
Europe with more stable and coherent frameworks of functioning, but at the 
same time, indirectly confirms the legitimacy and salience of the opposition 
between pro-integration and anti-federalist stances.  
The 2014 elections emerged thus as a failed “foundational moment” in 
bringing more legitimacy and mobilization for the European project. The 
articles in this issue focusing on the electoral campaigns in the European 
member states seem to confirm the local character of the EP competition in both 
old member states (Italy, Great Britain and, France) and in the new democracies 
(Bulgaria and Romania). In the Italian case, although the EU issues became 
more relevant for the campaign, politicians and voters used the elections in 
                                                 
43
 Andrea L.P. Pirro, “Populist Radical Right Parties in Central and Eastern Europe: The 
Different Context and Issues of the Prophets of the Patria”, Government and Opposition, 
vol. 49, no. 4, 2014, pp. 600-629; Jacques Rupnik, “Is East-Central Europe Backsliding? 
From Democracy Fatigue to Populist Backlash”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 18, no. 4, 
2007, pp. 17-25; Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2007; Sergiu Gherghina, Sergiu Mişcoiu (eds.), Partide şi 
personalităţi populiste în România postcomunistă, Institutul European, Iaşi, 2010. 
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order to sanction or to support the national government. Sorina Soare shows that 
within the context of the European crisis, the traditional economic dimension 
prevailed. The electoral volatility, the perception of low stakes in the European 
elections and, the timing of the elections (one year after the national elections) 
reduced the salience of this competition to a mere confirmation of the Renzi 
government. In a similar vein, based on the analysis of campaign party 
manifesto, Cristina Pârâu shows that in Great Britain national concerns 
prevailed in the European race. The anti-immigration feelings and the economic 
reforms were at the heart of the UK electoral campaign. Moreover, differently 
from the Italian case, in the United Kingdom, the victory of the Independence 
Party (UKIP) had direct implications in shaping national politics. UKIP 
succeeded to capture an important share of the electorate and to erode the 
legitimacy of the traditional parties by advocating the withdrawal from the EU. 
These programmatic dimensions favored the party in achieving electoral 
success, but also directly contributed in diverging the mainstream parties’ 
discourses towards more anti-European claims. The French case also seems to 
confirm the overall tradition of the EP electoral campaign nationalization. 
Selma Bendjaballah argues that in spite of the prominent role of the French 
politics within the EU project, the EP elections are still dependent on the 
“protest voting” in reference to national and particularly governmental driven 
experiences. Consequently, in France, the strong second-order nature of the 
European contests remained unaltered. The French citizens used the 2014 EP 
elections in order to sanction national level politicians and the mainstream 
parties. By the same token, the analysis also suggests additional limitations of 
the European reforms. In spite of the Front National’s landmark victory, the 
French EP elections are relevant for both UMP and the socialists, but it has 
virtual no effects at the EU level.As Bendjaballah mentioned in the concluding 
remarks: “The institutional design of both the EU and the EP makes no room 
for other attitudes than negotiation and search for compromise”.  
Unsurprisingly, the EP elections in the new democracies showed 
analogous practices and suggest even fewer attempts of Europeanizing the 
European elections. Petia Gueorguieva emphasizes that the protest vote, 
sanctioning the incumbent government, was the leading factor in the articulation 
of the Bulgarian elections. Low turnouts, nationally oriented campaigns, lack of 
European debates characterized the electoral race. However, in the Bulgarian 
case, the European elections coupled with civic contestation produced a change 
in government and the organization of by-elections on the 5th of October. 
Differently from Western democracies where populist movements had an 
important role in the EP elections, in the new democracies there is not a 
symmetrical articulation of strong forms of criticism towards the EU 
functioning. Conversely, the elections target national issues, particularly from 
the perspective of the left-right wing economic dimension. This also seems to 
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be the case in the Polish elections. Low electoral turnouts prevailed in Poland, 
despite of the high levels of citizens’ support for the European institutions. 
Moreover, Piotr Sula argues that the EP competition in 2014 was primarily 
oriented towards national-driven issues and negative campaigning. The ascent 
of the Eurosceptic party KNP is far from articulating a new cleavage in the 
Polish party competition. The EP’s volatile electoral support and the 
charismatic leadership of KNP raise additional questions on the stability of anti-
integrationist claims within the Polish political system. The salience of national 
issues prevails thus in shaping the EP competition results (particularly the 
redistributive function of the state). Nevertheless, as Sergiu Gherghina explains 
the contrast between the EU electoral agenda and the national debates is not the 
only difficulty in shaping new forms of representation or a common ground for 
the EP competitions. In the Romanian case, even within national parties there 
are high levels of ideological disagreement between candidates and their parties. 
One third of the candidates in the Romanian EP elections see themselves as 
positioned to another ideological position than their parties. Even party 
candidates seem to demand more clear-cut programmatic divisions and 
ideological clarity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
